Kashmiris’ Rights outfit KDC takes the Yasin Malik Affidavit to the United Nations.

Islamabad : Turkiya-based world-fame Kashmiri rights outfit – The Kashmir Diaspora Coalition has formally written to UN Secretary-General António Guterres concerning jaoled Kashmir freedom struggle  leader and JKLF supremo Yasin Malik’s affidavit, it was officially said.

“Our intervention is not simply about one individual or one criminal proceeding”, said Dr. Mubeen Shah, the KDC Supremo and Kashmiri leader from IIOJK, currently in exile in Istanbul while talking to our Special Jammu Kashmir state Correspondent Altaf Hamid Rao from Istanbul on Wednesday.

Reaponding to series of questions, Dr. Shah said “It raises a larger question:

If the world wants armed struggle to end, what happens when those who move towards peaceful political engagement find that the political space has disappeared?

“KDC has called for meaningful Kashmiri participation, restoration of political space, transparency concerning previous political engagements, due process and credible international support for a future political process”, Dr. Mubeen Shah  underlined.

He resolved that the gun may be silent, but the political question is not.

” We are making the KDC letter to the UN Secretary-General public”, he revealed.

Before Dr. Mubeen Shah,

Yasin Malik’s Affidavit stands as a  last Testimony on a Conflict and a Vanishing Peace Process.

“The Gun May Be Silent, But the Political Question Is Not”

Following is the letter writ by Dr. Mubeen Shah

There are moments when a legal document becomes much more than a legal document.

Yasin Malik’s latest affidavit is one such moment.

Behind the political controversy lies a deeply human story. A man who has spent years in prison speaks about his mother, his wife and his daughter, and about the years of separation that have marked his life.

His decision to speak about his family, his concern for his elderly mother, his wife’s future and his daughter, whom he says he has been unable to even speak for 8 years, gives the affidavit an intensely personal dimension.

Whatever one’s political opinion of Yasin Malik, it is difficult to read these passages without recognising the human cost of the Kashmir conflict.

But the affidavit is important for another reason.

It is Malik’s attempt to put his own version of his political journey on record.

And that story goes far beyond one court case.

Malik has denied involvement in the 1990 killing of Kashmiri Pandit nurse Sarla Bhat and has described the allegations against him as baseless. At the same time, he has said that he does not wish to contest the present proceedings and has asked for capital punishment, while making clear that this should not be interpreted as an admission of guilt. His 25-page affidavit has therefore raised questions that are simultaneously legal, political and deeply personal.

Why would a man ask for his own capital punishment?

This is perhaps the most difficult question raised by the affidavit.

Malik denies involvement in the killing of Sarla Bhat. Yet he asks the court to impose the death penalty.

That apparent contradiction cannot easily be understood as an ordinary legal strategy.

It appears instead to reflect a profound loss of faith in the proceedings and a determination to put his own account of his political life into the historical record.

His affidavit is therefore not simply a response to a prosecution.

It is, in many respects, a political testimony from a prisoner who believes that his version of history will otherwise disappear.

That is why the document deserves to be examined beyond the immediate criminal proceedings.

I came to know Yasin Malik in 2008

I first came to know Yasin Malik personally in 2008.

Before that, like many Kashmiris, I knew him principally as one of the prominent faces of the freedom movement that emerged after 1990.

My subsequent interactions with him gave me a different understanding of his political position.

I found him to be a committed person who wanted a settlement of the Kashmir issue in which Kashmiris themselves would have the principal say.

He was particularly clear on one point: Kashmiris had to be present at the final negotiating table.

For him, the principle was the right of self-determination.

That principle did not necessarily predetermine the final answer. The people of Kashmir, in his understanding, should ultimately determine their political future although he himself believes in Independent Kashmir .

That distinction is important.

From armed struggle to peaceful politics

The most significant part of Malik’s political journey is his transition from armed struggle towards peaceful political engagement.

He had been associated with the armed phase of the Kashmir movement. But he subsequently chose another path: dialogue and peaceful political struggle.

This transition did not happen in isolation.

As reflected in his affidavit, Malik describes contacts with senior Indian political, security and intelligence figures. He also places these contacts within the larger political opening associated first with Atal Bihari Vajpayee and subsequently with Manmohan Singh.

But the larger question is more important than any individual meeting.

If someone involved in an armed conflict is encouraged to abandon violence and enter peaceful politics, what happens when the political process that encouraged that transition subsequently disappears?

Malik’s position appears to be that he kept his side of the bargain.

The question is whether the Indian state kept its side.

Vajpayee must not disappear from this history

There is another problem with the way this history is now being remembered.

After 2019, Malik’s contacts during the Manmohan Singh period have received considerable political attention, particularly in the context of criticism of the Congress.

But this creates a danger of selective history.

The serious political opening began earlier, under Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

Vajpayee understood that Kashmir could not be addressed exclusively through a security framework. His outreach to Pakistan and his engagement with Kashmir created an atmosphere in which political dialogue became possible.

The process was subsequently carried forward under Manmohan Singh.

Indeed, the India-Pakistan back channel of 2004–07 is now well documented. A Georgetown University study describes nearly three years of confidential negotiations conducted by appointed Indian and Pakistani interlocutors, aimed at resolving the Kashmir dispute. By early 2007, the interlocutors were reportedly preparing to finalise a possible agreement, which would ultimately have been made public had it been concluded. The process collapsed amid political turmoil in Pakistan.

This history matters enormously.

It demonstrates that India and Pakistan were not treating Kashmir merely as an internal Indian matter.

They were discussing it as a political issue requiring engagement between the two countries.

The political opening therefore cannot honestly be reduced to a Congress-era story.

Vajpayee opened the door; Manmohan Singh continued the process.

Whatever one’s political preferences, that is part of the historical record.

The problem was not that there were back channels

Back-channel diplomacy is not inherently wrong.

In difficult conflicts, confidential contacts are often necessary to explore possibilities before governments are ready to expose them to public scrutiny.

The problem comes when confidentiality becomes permanent and the people whose future is being discussed remain outside the process.

That was one of the great weaknesses of the Kashmir dialogue.

India and Pakistan could communicate privately.

They could exchange proposals.

They could explore formulas.

They could discuss governance, movement across the Line of Control, security arrangements and other difficult questions.

But where, ultimately, were the Kashmiris themselves?

This is the fundamental question.

Confidentiality may be necessary at the beginning of diplomacy. Permanent secrecy cannot be the foundation of a legitimate settlement.

From my own understanding of the interactions surrounding that period, there was a strong desire among Kashmiri interlocutors that the existence of the political dialogue should eventually be publicly acknowledged.

That was important not simply for publicity.

It was important for credibility.

A person who has abandoned armed struggle in favour of peaceful politics needs to know that the political process is real, recognised and capable of producing an outcome.

The Ambani question

Malik’s affidavit also raises questions concerning Dhirubhai Ambani and the wider political and economic environment surrounding India-Pakistan contacts.

This subject deserves careful examination rather than sensationalism.

There is material in the public domain linking Ambani and his associates to contacts surrounding India-Pakistan diplomacy.

A 2002 Dawn report described Dhirubhai Ambani as having played an unusual role as a private channel between India and Pakistan and reported that R.K. Mishra, associated with Ambani, travelled to Pakistan in 1999 in circumstances connected with Vajpayee’s efforts during the Kargil crisis. The same report described contacts involving Pakistani officials and Niaz Naik.

Separately, reporting on Sanjaya Baru’s account of the Manmohan Singh period has alleged that Reliance had an interest in the India-Pakistan peace process and that R.K. Mishra was associated with the earlier Vajpayee back channel.

The important questions are therefore not simply about one businessman.

They are much larger:

What political, economic and strategic interests surrounded the India-Pakistan peace process?

Who knew what?

Who was talking to whom?

And what exactly was being discussed about Kashmir?

These questions deserve answers .

Pakistan has questions to answer too

Pakistan cannot use Malik’s affidavit merely as another opportunity to criticise India.

It must examine its own record.

What did successive Pakistani governments know about the negotiations?

What proposals were discussed?

What role did Pakistani interlocutors play?

What was communicated to Kashmiri representatives?

And, most importantly:

Where were the Kashmiris themselves in these negotiations?

Pakistan has consistently maintained that the people of Kashmir have a right to self-determination.

That principle must also mean that Kashmiris are not merely the subject of negotiations between two states.

They must be principal participants in determining their future.

If Pakistan was involved in these processes, it should tell the people of Kashmir what its side of the story was.

Are India and Pakistan talking again?

This question has become particularly relevant today.

There have been reports of renewed India-Pakistan Track-II and back-channel contacts. Such reports should not, however, be confused with an acknowledged formal government-to-government negotiation.

That distinction is important.

But whether contacts are official, unofficial, Track-II or genuinely back-channel, the lesson of the earlier process should be clear:

Kashmiris cannot again be left outside the room.

If India and Pakistan are once more exploring ways of managing or resolving their differences, the worst possible outcome would be for Kashmiris to discover years later that their future had been discussed without them.

That would reproduce precisely the distrust that undermined previous initiatives.

India and Pakistan should open the record

There is therefore a constructive proposal that both countries should seriously consider.

India and Pakistan should progressively open the historical records of their previous Kashmir negotiations, subject only to narrowly defined and genuinely necessary national-security restrictions.

Let historians examine them.

Let Kashmiris examine them.

Let the public understand what was actually discussed.

This would serve both countries.

It would also expose the weakness in the post-2019 assertion that Kashmir is simply an internal matter.

If successive Indian governments negotiated with Pakistan over Kashmir; if back channels were established; if political formulas were explored; and if senior Indian and Pakistani representatives spent years discussing possible arrangements, then the historical record itself demonstrates that Kashmir has repeatedly been treated as a political issue requiring engagement beyond India’s domestic political process.

Transparency would not weaken India or Pakistan. It would strengthen history.

What does this mean for the youth of Kashmir?

This may ultimately be the most important question raised by the entire episode.

Does Yasin Malik’s affidavit mean that the freedom movement is dead?

No.

A political aspiration does not disappear simply because one phase of a movement has failed.

But the answer should not be a return to armed struggle either.

No responsible person should encourage young Kashmiris to take up arms.

The lesson of Malik’s journey should be precisely the opposite.

Around the world, governments and the international community repeatedly encourage armed movements to abandon violence and enter peaceful political processes.

Why?

Because political settlement is preferable to endless conflict.

If Kashmiris make that transition, peaceful political engagement must have meaning.

Otherwise a dangerous message is sent to the next generation:

that those who abandon the gun for politics are ultimately abandoned by politics itself.

That is a message neither India nor Pakistan—or the international community—should want Kashmir’s youth to receive.

Could another generation return to violence?

No responsible person can predict that violence will return, and nobody should encourage it.

But neither should we pretend that history does not matter.

Kashmir has repeatedly demonstrated that political grievances can remain unresolved and later re-emerge when circumstances change.

The absence of violence at a particular moment does not necessarily mean that the underlying political question has been resolved.

If young Kashmiris conclude that peaceful political activity is permanently closed, while India and Pakistan continue to discuss Kashmir among themselves—openly or through back channels—the resulting frustration could create conditions for another cycle of conflict.

The responsible response is therefore not to predict another armed uprising.

It is to prevent the political conditions that could produce one.

India must create genuine political space.

Pakistan must recognise that Kashmir cannot simply remain an India-Pakistan dispute.

Kashmiri political forces must develop a credible and peaceful political strategy.

And the international community must support political engagement before violence returns, rather than waiting for violence to return before taking Kashmir seriously.

Maqbool Bhat, Afzal Guru and Yasin Malik

The cases of Maqbool Bhat, Afzal Guru and Yasin Malik represent different stages of Kashmir’s political history.

Maqbool Bhat became a powerful symbol of the armed phase of the Kashmir movement.

Afzal Guru’s execution became another profound source of alienation and controversy.

Yasin Malik represents something different: the attempt to move from armed struggle towards peaceful political engagement.

These cases should not be reduced to slogans.

They should be studied as part of the evolution of Kashmir’s political conflict.

And one lesson should be unmistakable:

Peaceful political struggle must have meaning.

If the international community wants armed conflicts to move towards peaceful resolution, it must also ensure that those who abandon armed resistance and enter peaceful politics are not simply left without meaningful political space.

A different kind of negotiation is needed

The experience of the past suggests that another purely bilateral and secret process will not be enough.

India and Pakistan have tried bilateral diplomacy repeatedly.

They have also tried back-channel negotiations.

Kashmiris have too often remained outside the decisive part of the process.

A future process must therefore be different.

Kashmiris must be principal participants—not merely the subject of negotiations between India and Pakistan.

In my view, any future negotiations should also have credible international guarantees, potentially involving the permanent members of the UN Security Council, so that all participants can enter the process with confidence that political engagement will not subsequently become a trap.

International involvement need not mean imposing a solution on India, Pakistan or Kashmir.

It can instead provide guarantees for the process, participation, continuity and security of the negotiations.

Above all, no future process should be capable of quietly excluding the people whose future is being decided.

Kashmiris must reclaim their political narrative

For too long, Kashmir’s history has been narrated primarily from New Delhi and Islamabad.

India has its narrative.

Pakistan has its narrative.

Kashmiris need their own.

That narrative must be honest enough to acknowledge the suffering of Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits.

It must acknowledge displacement, killings, disappearances, imprisonment and repression.

It must acknowledge the suffering caused by armed groups.

It must acknowledge political failures.

And it must acknowledge those who attempted to move from armed struggle towards peaceful political engagement.

We cannot build a credible future by remembering only those parts of our history that support our preferred political position.

The Kashmir story is too complex, and its human cost too great, for that.

The gun may be silent, but the political question is not

Yasin Malik’s affidavit should therefore not be viewed simply as another document in a criminal case.

It forces us to revisit the history of Kashmir’s political struggle, the promises and expectations surrounding the transition from armed resistance to peaceful politics, and the India-Pakistan dialogue processes that repeatedly took place without sufficient Kashmiri ownership.

It also forces India and Pakistan to answer a fundamental question:

If they were able to negotiate Kashmir privately, why were Kashmiris not placed at the centre of those negotiations?

And it forces Kashmiris to ask another:

What political future do we want, and how do we pursue it peacefully and credibly?

The answer cannot be another cycle of violence.

Nor can it be the pretence that the political question has disappeared.

The gun may be silent.

The political question is not.

The challenge now is to create a peaceful political process in which India and Pakistan are participants, the international community provides credible guarantees, and Kashmiris themselves have the principal voice in determining their future.

Perhaps the most important message for the younger generation is this:

A movement does not have to choose between surrender and the gun. There must be a third path—the path of peaceful political struggle, backed by a genuine political process capable of delivering a settlement.

That path must not be allowed to die.